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Limerick Local Studies https://limericklocalstudies.ie › leader1916 PDF Mr Ernest Blythe, described as Organiser for is custody to Dublin. the … Mr M Comyn, KC (instructed by Mr Roger go bréaurs tabanne Seáin U Tuama … can you elaborate on this

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The provided snippet appears to be an OCR-scanned excerpt from a digitized edition of the Limerick Leader newspaper in 1916, available through the Limerick Local Studies digital archive. The text contains typical scanning errors (e.g., garbled words due to faded print or font recognition issues), but it likely reports on local court proceedings or arrests related to Irish nationalist activities in the lead-up to the Easter Rising (April 24–29, 1916). Based on historical records, this seems to reference the arrest of Ernest Blythe and possibly related legal appearances. I’ll break it down and provide context below, correcting probable OCR errors where they align with known facts.

Corrected and Interpreted Snippet

The original text reads: “Mr Ernest Blythe, described as Organiser for is custody to Dublin. the … Mr M Comyn, KC (instructed by Mr Roger go bréaurs tabanne Seáin U Tuama …”A plausible correction, based on historical accounts of the events and common OCR misreads (e.g., “for” becoming “go bréaurs,” which might be a mangling of “Fox for the” or an Irish phrase like “go brách” meaning “forever,” but more likely a solicitor’s name or “for the accused”), could be something like:”Mr Ernest Blythe, described as Organiser for [the Irish Volunteers], [taken in] custody to Dublin. […] Mr M Comyn, KC (instructed by Mr Roger [Fox, solicitor]) [appeared] for [the accused] Seáin U Tuama…”This is not an exact transcription (since direct access to the PDF for verification failed due to technical issues), but it fits the era’s newspaper style and the individuals involved.Key Figures and Context

• Ernest Blythe (1889–1975): A Northern Irish Protestant who became a dedicated Irish nationalist. He learned the Irish language, joined the Gaelic League, and by 1913 was a full-time organizer for the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) and Irish Volunteers in County Kerry and Limerick. Blythe was known for anti-British recruiting efforts during World War I, promoting Irish independence instead of enlistment in the British Army. en.wikipedia.org He had been arrested once before in March 1915 for similar activities and served time in Belfast’s Crumlin Road Gaol. en.wikipedia.org In early 1916, after being deported to England, he secretly returned to Ireland and resumed organizing in Limerick. He was rearrested around mid-April 1916 (the week before the Rising) in Athea, County Limerick, as part of British efforts to suppress potential uprisings by detaining key figures like him and Liam Mellows (arrested in Galway around the same time). irishexaminer.com +1 Blythe refused deportation to Britain, leading to his transfer to Dublin initially, then imprisonment in England (Knutsford), where he missed participating in the Rising. theirishwar.com +1 After release later in 1916, he spent Christmas in Limerick with nationalist figures like Kathleen Clarke (widow of Tom Clarke, a Rising leader). dib.ie Blythe went on to become a Sinn Féin TD, Minister for Finance in the Irish Free State, and a controversial figure for cutting public spending (including the infamous “shilling off the old age pension” in 1924).
• Mr. M Comyn, KC: This refers to Michael Comyn, KC (King’s Counsel), a prominent Irish barrister and nationalist sympathizer based in Dublin. He frequently defended republicans and Sinn Féin members in court during this period, including in cases involving sedition, arms possession, or anti-recruiting activities. ucd.ie In this snippet, he appears to be representing a defendant, “instructed by” a solicitor (a common legal phrase meaning the solicitor hired him for the case). Comyn later became a senator in the Irish Free State and was involved in republican courts during the War of Independence.
• Mr Roger [likely Fox or similar]: This is probably the instructing solicitor. Historical records from the era mention solicitors like Roger Fox involved in nationalist cases, but without the full PDF, it’s speculative. Solicitors handled initial client contact and briefed barristers like Comyn.
• Seáin U Tuama: This seems to be an OCR error or variant spelling for “Seán Ua Tuama” or “Seán Ó Tuama,” a common Irish name (meaning “John O’Toomey” in English). No prominent figure by this exact name appears in 1916 arrest records, but it could refer to a local volunteer or co-accused arrested alongside Blythe. During this time, group arrests of Volunteers occurred in Limerick, and names were often Anglicized or misspelled in press reports. It might also be a garbled reference to another individual or even a phrase in Irish (e.g., “go bréag urs tabhairt” could be a misread of “go brách ar thabhairt,” but that’s unlikely). If it’s a separate case, it could be unrelated to Blythe but reported in the same article.

Broader Historical Context

This snippet captures the tense atmosphere in Ireland in early 1916, as British authorities cracked down on the growing Irish independence movement. The Irish Volunteers, founded in 1913, were drilling and organizing openly, while the IRB planned the Easter Rising. Arrests like Blythe’s were part of a preemptive strategy to disrupt these efforts—Blythe himself recalled in his Bureau of Military History witness statement that he was organizing companies in West Limerick when captured. irelandsown.ie +1 The Limerick Leader was a local paper that covered such events, often with sympathy toward nationalists (though under censorship). Limerick had strong republican ties—two executed Rising leaders, Edward Daly and Con Colbert, were from the area.

limericklocalstudies.ie The “custody to Dublin” likely refers to Blythe being transported to Dublin Castle or a court there for processing before further imprisonment or deportation. Court reports from the time often listed defendants, charges (e.g., seditious speeches or illegal drilling), and legal teams in this format. If this isn’t the elaboration you meant or if you have the full PDF attached (the tools indicate no attachment here), provide more details for further clarification!

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Blythe’s Bureau of Military History statement

Liam Mellows’ arrest

Blythe’s Bureau of Military History statement

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Ernest Blythe’s Bureau of Military History Witness Statement (WS 939)

Ernest Blythe’s witness statement to the Bureau of Military History, documented as WS 939 and dated April 12, 1954, is a detailed autobiographical account of his experiences in the Irish revolutionary period from 1905 to 1923. The original document is extensive (over 200 pages, including appendices with some redactions), so below is a comprehensive summary based on the full text. It covers his early life, entry into Irish nationalism, key organizational roles, arrests (with a focus on 1915–1916), the Easter Rising era, and activities up to 1921. Direct quotes from the statement are included for accuracy, particularly regarding his 1916 arrest in Limerick and related events. The summary is structured thematically for clarity.

Early Life and Background

Blythe, born in 1889 in County Antrim to a Protestant farming family, had little initial exposure to Irish culture or language. He attended Protestant services throughout his life, even using them strategically later (e.g., attending in Bantry in 1918 to “scandalize the local Loyalists”). At age 16, he moved to Dublin in March 1905 as a Boy Clerk in the Department of Agriculture. His first encounter with Irish speakers occurred outside the Gaelic League bookshop on O’Connell Street, prompting him to buy O’Growney’s Easy Lessons and study it that evening during a theater intermission. Hesitant due to his Protestant background, he joined the Gaelic League’s Central Branch in November 1905 during a demonstration for Dr. Douglas Hyde. His teachers included Sinéad Ní Fhlannagáin (later Mrs. de Valera). Through classmate George Irvine, he discovered Arthur Griffith’s United Irishman, which converted him to Sinn Féin: “I became converted to Sinn Féin on the night I sat up reading my first copy of the ‘United Irishman’.”

bmh.militaryarchives.ie He also joined a hurling club and befriended Seán O’Casey.

Entry into Nationalism and the I.R.B.

Blythe’s involvement deepened at age 18 (around 1907) when he joined the Irish Republican Brotherhood (I.R.B.) via O’Casey, who clarified its focus: “Sean said that the Fenians were completely against assassination, and that their policy was to prepare to make open war on England.”

bmh.militaryarchives.ie Sworn in at a Parnell Square meeting, his circle (disguised as the Bartholomew Teeling Literary Society) included figures like Seán T. O’Kelly and Cathal Brugha. He recruited actively, splitting the group into three. In 1908, he helped counter clerical opposition at Clontarf Town Hall. After leaving the civil service in 1909, he worked as a journalist at the North Down Herald and joined Belfast’s small I.R.B. circle under Denis McCullough and Bulmer Hobson. He recruited Seán Lester and ran the Dungannon Club for Irish classes and lectures, despite opposition from Hibernians and Orangemen.In 1913, he immersed himself in Kerry’s Gaeltacht as a farm laborer, committing to speak only Irish: “I decided that in no circumstances would I speak any English there.”

bmh.militaryarchives.ie By 1915, he was drilling Volunteers, becoming captain of the Lispole Company after taking over a drill session. He organized in Cork, Kerry, Limerick, and Clare, noting varying strengths (e.g., Mitchelstown was robust, while Mallow’s company was a “drinking pretext”). Police surveillance aided recruitment: “it was a really good advertisement.”

bmh.militaryarchives.ie Post-1916 release, he reorganized in Limerick (1917–1918), forming new companies amid religious society conflicts: “Between Sodalities and Confraternities there was not so much as one night in the week in which everyone was free.”

bmh.militaryarchives.ie As Gaelic League organizer in West Cork (1918), he prioritized Volunteers and Cumann na mBan. He edited The Southern Star and contributed to prison publications like The Outpost.

Key Arrests in 1915–1916 and Easter Rising Period

Blythe’s arrests were pivotal. In July 1915, he received a Defence of the Realm Act deportation order in Ennistymon: “ordering me to leave the ‘following area, namely Ireland’, within about a fortnight.”

bmh.militaryarchives.ie Refusing, he was arrested in Rockcorry and jailed in Belfast for three months, released in November 1915. By March 1916, he was organizing in Limerick, staying with the Dalys. On St. Patrick’s Day, Seán McDermott visited and hinted at an imminent Rising. On March 18, 1916, he was arrested in Athea: “A District Inspector and four or five R.I.C. men rushed into the room. The District Inspector told me he was arresting me.”

bmh.militaryarchives.ie Police missed his pistol. Deported to England, he escaped briefly but was re-arrested and imprisoned in Oxford, then Brixton, where he met Roger Casement. Isolated during the Rising, he received no news: “no letters from anybody during all this time” and “was still left, at the end of a month, without the slightest knowledge of what had happened at home.”

bmh.militaryarchives.ie He learned vaguely from a convict about a naval battle. Transferred to Reading Jail in July 1916 with Griffith and others, he became captain and wrote in Irish for The Outpost. Released before Christmas 1916, he violated his deportation order.Later arrests included Belfast in 1917, Skibbereen in 1918 (joining a hunger strike), and Belfast in 1919 as Vice-Commandant, enforcing strict discipline. He participated in a 1919 prison revolt.

Roles Up to 1921.

As Dáil Éireann’s Director (later Minister) of Trade and Commerce (1919–1921), Blythe promoted boycotts, established consuls, and initiated co-operatives. He opposed the Belfast Boycott as “ridiculous.” In Cabinet meetings, he noted tensions between Collins and de Valera over the latter’s U.S. trip. He met Archbishop Clune during truce talks and criticized Brugha as having “very limited intelligence” but “unlimited physical courage.”

bmh.militaryarchives.ie

The statement extends to Treaty debates and the Civil War (e.g., Collins’s death), but focuses primarily on pre-1921 events. For the full PDF, visit the source URL.

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Extract full 1916 arrest section

Bulmer Hobson witness statement

During civil war some Free State cabinet members believed in negotiations rather than war. There is reference to judges input. The meeting was with W.T. Cosgrave and deValera. Can you elaborate?

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Context from Ernest Blythe’s Bureau of Military History Witness Statement (WS 939)

The query appears to reference details from Ernest Blythe’s extensive witness statement (WS 939, submitted April 12, 1954) to the Bureau of Military History, which covers his experiences up to the Irish Civil War (June 1922–May 1923). Blythe, a pro-Treaty Sinn Féin TD and Minister for Trade/Commerce (later Finance) in the Provisional Government/Irish Free State Executive Council, provides insider accounts of cabinet dynamics during the escalating tensions and war. The Civil War stemmed from divisions over the Anglo-Irish Treaty (signed December 1921, ratified January 1922), pitting pro-Treaty forces (led by figures like Michael Collins, Arthur Griffith, and W.T. Cosgrave) against anti-Treaty republicans (led by Éamon de Valera and others). Blythe’s narrative highlights internal Free State cabinet debates where some members indeed favored negotiations or compromises to avoid or end the conflict, rather than full-scale war. There are references to judicial involvement, primarily in adversarial legal challenges rather than neutral mediation. Notably, while there were indirect communications and proxy meetings involving de Valera, Blythe does not describe a direct meeting between Cosgrave (who became President of the Executive Council after Griffith’s and Collins’s deaths in August 1922) and de Valera during the war—though one key incident involves a secret Mulcahy-de Valera rendezvous disclosed to a cabinet meeting presided over by Cosgrave. Below, I elaborate thematically, drawing on Blythe’s accounts with direct quotes for accuracy. Page references are approximate based on the statement’s structure.

1. Cabinet Members Favoring Negotiations Over War

Blythe describes pre- and early-war cabinet divisions, where several members (including Collins and Mulcahy) leaned toward compromises to prevent escalation, while others (like Griffith) pushed for assertive action. This reflects a broader “tendency to hope that the struggle might be brought to an end by negotiations” amid growing war weariness, especially after Collins’s death (August 22, 1922), when the conflict became “chronic” with “widespread sort of unwillingness to really carry on the struggle with a full energy.”

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• George Gavan Duffy’s Reluctance for Prolonged Conflict: As Minister for Foreign Affairs, Gavan Duffy consistently advocated for de-escalation. During discussions on attacking the anti-Treaty-occupied Four Courts (June 1922), he inquired how long the operation would take and later complained he “would not have been in favour of the action taken if he had realised that the struggle was going to be so prolonged and expensive of life and property.” bmh.militaryarchives.ie. He also pushed for treating captured irregulars as prisoners-of-war under the Geneva Convention to potentially open negotiation channels: “forthwith declare that all prisoners taken by us would receive prisoner-of-war treatment.” bmh.militaryarchives.ie The cabinet rejected this, viewing opponents as “rebels,” leading to Gavan Duffy’s frustration and eventual resignation in July 1922.
• Michael Collins and Richard Mulcahy’s Compromise Leanings: In the Limerick Crisis (April–May 1922), Collins was “obviously somewhat torn both ways” between Griffith’s call for military assertion and Mulcahy’s proposal to hand over barracks to anti-Treaty leader Liam Lynch as a holding measure. bmh.militaryarchives.ie. Collins accepted Mulcahy’s idea, averting immediate conflict but straining relations with Griffith. The Collins-de Valera Electoral Pact (May 1922) was another negotiation attempt, driven by Collins’s “desire to get some sort of a popular verdict for the Treaty” without war. bmh.militaryarchives.ie Cabinet ratification was reluctant, with Griffith under “tremendous emotional stress” before agreeing.
• Broader Cabinet and Army Sentiment Post-Collins’s Death: After August 1922, Blythe notes “some slight divergence of opinion in the ranks of the pro-Treaty Deputies… there was certainly some suggestion of a split and of an attempt to bring the Civil War to an end by negotiations.” bmh.militaryarchives.ie. Whispers of a “composite Government” involving dissidents, Labour, and Farmers’ Party members circulated, but the majority view was to “fight to a finish.” Army commanders also sought “contacts for discussions,” indicating negotiation undercurrents. bmh.militaryarchives.ie

2. References to Judges’ Input

Judicial involvement in Blythe’s account is limited and adversarial, focusing on legal challenges to Free State actions rather than proactive peace mediation. No judges are depicted as neutral facilitators in negotiations.

• Michael Comyn’s Dáil Court Application (Early July 1922): Anti-Treaty barrister Michael Comyn applied for a writ of prohibition from Judge Crowley to halt Provisional Government operations. Judge Crowley “took the usual course of directing that notice should be served on the Government and requiring it to show cause why the writ applied for should not issue.” bmh.militaryarchives.ie. The cabinet responded by abolishing the Dáil High Court via decree, overriding Gavan Duffy’s protest against this “treatment of a High Court.” bmh.militaryarchives.ie This illustrates judges’ indirect “input” as potential obstacles to government authority during the war.
• Habeas Corpus Fears in Executions (Late 1922): Amid executions (e.g., Erskine Childers in November 1922), there was cabinet concern that “some cracked Judge might order his release” via habeas corpus, as “a single Judge could decide a Habeas Corpus case.” bmh.militaryarchives.ie Debate ensued on responses: Some (including Blythe) favored shutting down ex-British courts until war’s end; others opposed. One proposal was immediate execution post-denial to prevent further appeals, but Mulcahy opposed it “with great force.” bmh.militaryarchives.ie. No actual judicial intervention occurred, but it highlights fears of judges undermining military rigor.

These instances show judges as part of the legal framework the Free State navigated, not as peace brokers.

3. Meetings or Interactions Involving Cosgrave and de Valera

Blythe mentions no direct wartime meeting between W.T. Cosgrave and Éamon de Valera. Pre-war interactions (e.g., Treaty debates) involved de Valera indirectly, such as Griffith’s remark after a rejected plebiscite idea: “That was the first time I ever got after de Valera properly.”

bmh.militaryarchives.ie The closest wartime reference is a proxy encounter:

• Mulcahy’s Secret Meeting with de Valera (Mid-1922, Post-Collins’s Death): Arranged by Father McGuinness (Carmelite Provincial), Army Chief of Staff Richard Mulcahy met de Valera secretly right after a cabinet meeting (presided by Cosgrave) where the group decided “nobody on behalf of the Government would negotiate any more, and that military operations would be carried on with all rigour until the Irregular forces surrendered.” bmh.militaryarchives.ie Mulcahy “appeared to agree fully” but “went straight out of the Cabinet meeting, got into his car… and drove to a rendezvous with Mr. de Valera.” bmh.militaryarchives.ie At a follow-up cabinet meeting, Mulcahy confessed: “‘Let everyone put his gun on the table’… He then proceeded to confess… that before the previous meeting he had made arrangements to meet Mr. de Valera, had refrained from disclosing the fact… and had gone straight away to the rendezvous. He then gave some details of his conversation with de Valera, to which I think nobody paid much attention.” bmh.militaryarchives.ie The cabinet fell silent; Cosgrave abruptly ended it: “‘That’s all’, got up and left his chair.” bmh.militaryarchives.ie Nothing resulted from the talks, but the incident exposed cabinet tensions—Blythe notes it eroded his confidence in Mulcahy, and no one demanded resignation due to fragile government-army relations.

This Mulcahy-de Valera rendezvous (with Cosgrave’s indirect involvement via the disclosure) may be the “meeting” referenced, as it ties into broader peace whispers. The war ended not through negotiated settlement but via anti-Treaty cease-fire orders (e.g., Liam Deasy’s in early 1923) and de Valera’s May 1923 proclamation calling off armed resistance.

bmh.militaryarchives.ie For broader historical context, other sources note additional peace initiatives (e.g., a 1922 Neutral IRA committee or 1923 clerical efforts), but Blythe’s insider view focuses on cabinet internals. erinascendantwordpress.wordpress.com +1 If this isn’t the exact reference you meant, provide more details!

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Liam Lynch’s role in peace talks

Neutral IRA peace committee

Michael Comyn’s Dáil Court Application (Early July 1922):

Anti-Treaty barrister Michael Comyn applied for a writ of prohibition from Judge Crowley to halt Provisional Government operations. Can you elaborate on anything else of this nature at that time? Michael Comyn KC was de Valera’s legal adviser, he represented Erskine Childers, he was involved in cases relating to war for independence and the civil war, is there any direct links between him and Ernest Blythe through IRB or Gaelic League etc or any contact between Comyn and Michael Collins, Arthur Griffith, Ernest Blythe, Michael Collins

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Other Legal Challenges Similar to Michael Comyn’s Dáil Court Application (Early July 1922). Michael Comyn’s application for a writ of prohibition in early July 1922 was a notable attempt by anti-Treaty republicans to use the republican-established Dáil Courts (set up in 1920 as an alternative to British judicial systems) to legally undermine the Provisional Government’s authority. Instructed by solicitor James G. Skinner, Comyn argued before Judge Diarmuid Crowley that the Provisional Government’s operations were illegal under the Dáil Constitution, seeking to prohibit them from functioning.

canisgallicus.com This occurred amid the outbreak of the Civil War, following the bombardment of the Four Courts (June 28–30, 1922), and reflected republican efforts to leverage legal mechanisms for political leverage rather than solely military means. The Provisional Government responded decisively by issuing a decree on July 7, 1922, abolishing the Dáil High Court to neutralize such challenges, effectively suspending republican judicial structures.

bmh.militaryarchives.ie. While Comyn’s case is one of the most documented examples of direct legal obstructionism, several similar actions or related judicial maneuvers occurred around this period (late June to early August 1922), as anti-Treaty forces and their supporters tested the boundaries of law amid escalating violence. These often involved habeas corpus writs (challenging unlawful detention) or attempts to assert republican court legitimacy over the emerging Free State apparatus. Below is an elaboration on key instances, drawn from historical accounts:

1. Occupation of the Four Courts as a Symbolic Legal Protest (April–June 1922)

• Prior to the Civil War’s formal outbreak, anti-Treaty IRA forces under Rory O’Connor occupied Dublin’s Four Courts building on April 14, 1922. This was not just a military stronghold but a deliberate legal and symbolic act: The Four Courts housed the Dáil Courts’ records and served as the seat of republican justice. Occupiers framed it as a defense of the Irish Republic against the Provisional Government’s pro-Treaty stance, effectively using the judicial site to “protest” the government’s legitimacy and the creation of the National Army. samswarroom.com Legal proceedings continued sporadically within the occupied building, with anti-Treaty judges like Crowley issuing rulings. This standoff escalated tensions, leading to the government’s ultimatum and bombardment on June 28, 1922, which destroyed much of the judicial archives and marked the war’s start. It parallels Comyn’s writ in using legal infrastructure to challenge government authority, though more confrontational.

2. Habeas Corpus Applications for Anti-Treaty Prisoners (July–August 1922)

• Following the Four Courts surrender and subsequent arrests, republicans frequently sought habeas corpus writs from remaining British-style courts (which the Provisional Government was transitioning from) to secure releases. For instance:
  • Maud Gonne and Charlotte Despard (July 1922): Arrested for anti-Treaty activities, their lawyers applied for habeas corpus, arguing unlawful detention without charge. The government resisted, citing emergency powers under the Defence of the Realm Act (extended into 1922), and the cases highlighted the clash between republican ideals and inherited British law. legalblog.ie
  • Mary MacSwiney (August 1922): The sister of Terence MacSwiney (who died on hunger strike in 1920) was arrested and sought habeas corpus. Her case, like others, was dismissed or delayed amid government decrees suspending such writs for “rebels.” This mirrored Comyn’s strategy by attempting to use courts to delegitimize arrests, but the Provisional Government countered by empowering military tribunals and limiting judicial oversight. ucc.ie
• These applications often failed due to the government’s July 1922 Public Safety Resolution, which allowed indefinite detention without trial, reflecting a broader shift from legal to martial authority.

3. Other Dáil Court Disputes and Injunctions (Ongoing in 1922)

• Comyn himself was involved in additional Dáil Court cases, such as representing fishermen in the Power and Dodd fishery dispute in 1922, where he defied the Irish Bar Council’s prohibition on practicing in republican courts. canisgallicus.com This defiance was common among republican barristers, leading to professional sanctions but underscoring efforts to maintain Dáil Courts’ viability.
• Broader challenges included attempts to enforce Dáil decrees against land grabs or property disputes amid war chaos, with judges like Crowley issuing injunctions against Provisional Government actions in rural areas. However, by mid-1922, these courts were largely suppressed, with the government establishing its own judicial framework under the 1922 Constitution. ucd.ie

These actions illustrate the transitional legal turmoil: Republicans used courts to assert the 1919 Dáil’s sovereignty, while the Provisional Government prioritized stability, often overriding judicial processes. By late 1922, with executions and emergency laws, legal challenges waned as military realities dominated.

legalblog.ie Michael Comyn KC’s Background and Connections

Michael Comyn KC (1871–1952) was a prominent Irish barrister, republican activist, and later Fianna Fáil senator (1928–36), known for his staunch anti-Treaty stance. Born in Ballyvaughan, County Clare, to a tenant farmer and Land League secretary, he was called to the bar in 1898 and became King’s Counsel in 1912.

dib.ie He served as Éamon de Valera’s legal adviser during key periods, including the Treaty debates and Civil War, and represented high-profile republicans like Erskine Childers (executed November 1922 for arms possession) and others in sedition or arms cases during the War of Independence (1919–21) and Civil War.

theirishstory.com Comyn practiced in the underground Dáil Courts, defying Bar Council bans, and was involved in inquests (e.g., probing National Army killings like the Red Cow Murders in October 1922, where he cross-examined uncooperative officers). canisgallicus.com +1 He also advised on post-war matters, such as a 1924 memo on economic programs for republicans.

canisgallicus.com Direct Links to Ernest Blythe via IRB or Gaelic League

• No Strong Direct Links Found: Historical records do not indicate direct personal or organizational ties between Comyn and Ernest Blythe through the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) or Gaelic League. Blythe was a dedicated IRB organizer from 1907, focusing on recruitment and anti-recruiting in Kerry and Limerick, and was deeply involved in the Gaelic League from 1905, learning Irish and promoting it as a cultural tool for nationalism. bmh.militaryarchives.ie Comyn, while a republican activist, is not documented as an IRB member; his involvement was more legal and political, supporting Sinn Féin and de Valera. dib.ie
• Indirect or Familial Connections: Comyn was a fluent Irish speaker and likely sympathetic to Gaelic revivalism, given his Clare roots and republican circles. ucd.ie
• Shared Republican Context: Both were in broader Sinn Féin/IRB ecosystems—Comyn defended IRB-linked defendants, while Blythe was imprisoned multiple times. Their only documented “link” is adversarial: Blythe’s witness statement recounts Comyn’s 1922 writ application, which the pro-Treaty cabinet (including Blythe) quashed. bmh.militaryarchives.ie Comyn did not submit a Bureau of Military History witness statement, but he is mentioned in others (e.g., WS 624, noting him providing safe harbor after Harry Boland’s 1922 funeral). bmh.militaryarchives.ie +1

Contacts with Michael Collins, Arthur Griffith, or Ernest Blythe

• Primarily Adversarial or Indirect: No records of direct personal interactions, collaborations, or correspondences between Comyn and these pro-Treaty figures. As de Valera’s adviser, Comyn was firmly anti-Treaty, opposing Collins and Griffith during the 1921–22 debates. dspace.mic.ul.ie His representation of Childers (a close de Valera ally) pitted him against the Provisional Government, which included Collins (as Commander-in-Chief) and Griffith (as President until his death in August 1922).
• With Michael Collins: Indirect opposition—Comyn’s legal work challenged Collins-led actions, such as inquests into killings by Collins’s “Squad” during the War of Independence or Civil War detentions. No friendly contacts; Collins’s networks (e.g., intelligence via Seamus Dwyer) were separate. theirishstory.com Archival correspondences involving Collins (e.g., with Art O’Brien or James Douglas) do not mention Comyn. catalogue.nli.ie
• With Arthur Griffith: Similarly adversarial; Griffith, as Treaty negotiator, was targeted in republican rhetoric Comyn supported. No direct links in papers or debates.
• With Ernest Blythe: As above, only through the 1922 court episode, where Blythe (as Minister) helped dissolve the Dáil Courts in response to Comyn’s writ. bmh.militaryarchives.ie Post-war, both were in politics (Comyn in Seanad, Blythe as Finance Minister), but on opposing sides—Comyn with Fianna Fáil, Blythe with Cumann na nGaedheal.

In summary, Comyn’s role was as a legal bulwark for republicans, clashing with pro-Treaty leaders like Collins, Griffith, and Blythe rather than collaborating. If you have specific documents or contexts, I can refine further!

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Explore Erskine Childers’ trial

Rory O’Connor’s Four Courts role

Rory O’Connor’s Four Courts role

Thoughts

Rory O’Connor’s Background and Rise in Irish Republicanism

Roderick “Rory” O’Connor (1883–1922) was a prominent Irish republican activist, engineer, and military leader during the Irish revolutionary period. Born in Dublin to a Catholic family, he was educated at Jesuit institutions like St. Mary’s College and Clongowes Wood College, where he formed connections that would later intersect tragically (e.g., his schoolmate Kevin O’Higgins would authorize his execution). O’Connor earned degrees in arts (1906) and engineering (1911) from University College Dublin, advocating militant nationalism through groups like the Young Ireland branch of the United Irish League.

en.wikipedia.org After working as a railway engineer in Canada, constructing over 1,500 miles of track for the Canadian Pacific and Northern Railways, he returned to Ireland in 1915 at Joseph Plunkett’s request. He joined Dublin Corporation as a civil engineer while immersing himself in nationalist activities, including the Ancient Order of Hibernians.

en.wikipedia.org O’Connor’s revolutionary involvement began during the 1916 Easter Rising, where he served as an intelligence officer in the General Post Office (GPO) under Plunkett, sustaining a sniper wound during reconnaissance.

en.wikipedia.org By the Irish War of Independence (1919–1921), he rose to Director of Engineering for the Irish Republican Army (IRA), leveraging his expertise for signaling, munitions, and infrastructure sabotage. He played a key role in the 1919 Strangeways Prison breakout in Manchester, aiding the escape of IRA prisoners like Piaras Beaslaí with ladders and planning input from Michael Collins.

en.wikipedia.org As a member of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) and holding the rank of Commandant-General, O’Connor was instrumental in building the IRA’s technical capabilities, though he chafed at restrictions preventing his unit from frontline duties.

en.wikipedia.org Opposition to the Anglo-Irish Treaty and Lead-Up to the Four Courts Occupation O’Connor emerged as a staunch opponent of the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, viewing it as a betrayal of the 1916 Irish Republic by endorsing partition (leaving six counties in Northern Ireland under British control) and requiring an oath of allegiance to the British Crown.

en.wikipedia.org He aligned with anti-Treaty IRA factions, expressing to comrade Liam Archer his intent to fight the Treaty “with all my might” if supported.

en.wikipedia.org In January 1922, he hosted a pivotal meeting of anti-Treaty officers at his Monkstown home, forming the Republican Military Council with himself as chairman.

en.wikipedia.org By March, he claimed 80% of the IRA opposed the Treaty and organized a banned IRA Convention on March 26 in Dublin’s Mansion House, where delegates rejected Dáil authority, elected a 16-man Executive (including O’Connor), and reaffirmed allegiance to the Republic.

erinascendantwordpress.wordpress.com His provocative actions escalated tensions: On March 29, he led a raid on the pro-Treaty Freeman’s Journal offices, destroying equipment with sledgehammers and petrol in retaliation for its criticism of anti-Treaty “autocracy.”

erinascendantwordpress.wordpress.com At a follow-up convention on April 9, the Executive drafted a new army constitution, and O’Connor’s press conference response to a journalist—”You can take it that way if you want”—implied support for a military dictatorship, drawing widespread condemnation and framing the anti-Treaty side as militaristic. en.wikipedia.org +1 He dismissed peace efforts like the May 1 IRA officers’ manifesto (signed by figures from…

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Rory O’Connor any connection to Michael Comyn KC

Thought for 1m 23s

Rory O’Connor and Michael Comyn KC: Connections Analysis/ Rory O’Connor (1883–1922), a key anti-Treaty IRA leader and engineer who occupied the Four Courts in April 1922, and Michael Comyn KC (1871–1952), a barrister and legal adviser to Éamon de Valera who defended prominent republicans, shared no documented direct personal or professional connection based on historical records, witness statements, or archival materials reviewed. However, they were indirectly linked through their mutual involvement in the anti-Treaty republican cause during the Irish Civil War (1922–1923), where Comyn provided legal support to figures and events overlapping with O’Connor’s military activities. Below is a detailed breakdown, drawing on primary sources like Bureau of Military History (BMH) statements, Wikipedia entries, and related documents.Shared Context: Anti-Treaty Republicanism

• Both men aligned with the anti-Treaty side after the Anglo-Irish Treaty (December 1921), opposing the establishment of the Irish Free State. O’Connor viewed the Treaty as a betrayal of the 1916 Republic and led hardline military actions, including the Four Courts occupation, which escalated into the Civil War. en.wikipedia.org Comyn, initially knowing Michael Collins (a pro-Treaty leader and former friend of O’Connor), chose the anti-Treaty path and became de Valera’s principal legal adviser, handling cases for republicans and disrupting government inquests. en.wikipedia.org
• Their paths converged thematically around key Civil War events:
  • Four Courts and Executions: O’Connor was captured after the Free State’s bombardment of the Four Courts (June 30, 1922) and executed without trial on December 8, 1922, alongside Liam Mellows, Joe McKelvey, and Dick Barrett, as reprisal for the killing of TD Seán Hales. en.wikipedia.org Comyn was active in legal defenses during this period, including inquests into anti-Treaty deaths (e.g., Cathal Brugha and Harry Boland) to challenge Free State actions on behalf of the IRA. en.wikipedia.org While Comyn did not defend O’Connor (who had no trial), he represented Erskine Childers—another anti-Treaty figure executed in November 1922 for arms possession—in a military trial and High Court appeal, arguing technical grounds like the court’s illegality. en.wikipedia.org Childers’ case paralleled the reprisal executions, highlighting the broader legal-martial clash where Comyn operated.
  • Post-War Legal Actions: In 1932, Comyn sued de Valera’s government to recover £20,000 in IRA funds, tying into ongoing republican financial disputes from the Civil War era. en.wikipedia.org O’Connor, as a martyr figure, was invoked in republican narratives, but no link to Comyn’s suit exists.

No Evidence of Direct Interactions

• Bureau of Military History and Archival Searches: BMH Witness Statement WS 1413 (by Tadhg Kennedy) mentions O’Connor as secretary of a 1920 Dáil Local Government Commission and Comyn as defender in a 1921 court-martial for Philip Roche (an IRA informant), but in unrelated sections with no overlap. bmh.militaryarchives.ie The “Survivors” document (interviews by Uinseann MacEoin) references O’Connor in IRA executive contexts (e.g., with Mellows and McKelvey) and Comyn in a separate High Court action, but again separately—no joint activities described.
• Other Documents: In a Civil War Cantata script, O’Connor appears in Four Courts statements and execution notices, while Comyn is tied to Childers’ defense; no connections between them. civilwarcantata.ie Archival catalogs (e.g., National Library of Ireland) list items like execution cuttings (including O’Connor) and Comyn’s name in separate contexts, such as legal correspondence. catalogue.nli.ie +1
• Personal Networks: O’Connor was close to Collins pre-Treaty split and involved in prison escapes (e.g., Strangeways, 1919). en.wikipedia.org Comyn defended republicans in War of Independence cases (e.g., Re. Clifford and O’Sullivan, 1921, delaying executions via House of Lords appeal) but none involving O’Connor. en.wikipedia.org No shared IRB, Gaelic League, or family ties found.

Potential Indirect Overlaps

• Republican Legal Ecosystem: Comyn’s defenses often delayed or prevented executions for anti-Treaty prisoners, potentially benefiting O’Connor’s broader circle (e.g., Mellows’ mother sought Comyn’s help post-execution). canisgallicus.com O’Connor’s reprisal execution symbolized Free State harshness, which Comyn challenged in inquests and suits.
• Civil War Reprisals: Both featured in reprisal narratives—O’Connor as victim, Comyn as advocate against such actions. canisgallicus.com +1

In summary, while no direct connection exists, their indirect ties stem from anti-Treaty activism: O’Connor’s military defiance and Comyn’s legal resistance against the same Free State forces. If you have a specific document or angle, I can investigate further!

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Was there any connection between Michael Comyn KC and Ernie O’Malley

Thought for 2m 12s

Connection Between Michael Comyn KC and Ernie O’Malley

Michael Comyn KC (1871–1952), a prominent anti-Treaty barrister and legal adviser to Éamon de Valera, and Ernie O’Malley (1897–1957), a key IRA commander during the War of Independence and Civil War (serving as O/C of the Northern and Eastern Command for anti-Treaty forces), shared no documented direct personal interactions, such as meetings, collaborations, or correspondences between them. However, they were indirectly connected through their mutual involvement in the anti-Treaty republican movement during the Irish Civil War (1922–1923). Both operated within overlapping networks of IRA leaders and supporters, with Comyn providing legal counsel to republicans and O’Malley leading military operations. The primary evidence of this linkage comes from archival records of captured documents. Key Indirect Connection: Captured Letter at O’Malley’s Retreat

• A significant link is documented in the Desmond and Mabel FitzGerald Papers (held at University College Dublin Archives, catalogued as P80/769). ucd.ie This item is a copy of a letter dated September 20, 1922, from Michael Comyn (described as “Senior Counsel for the IRA”) to Austin Stack (a fellow anti-Treaty leader and former Minister for Home Affairs in the Dáil). The letter encloses a summary of recent events, discusses resolutions before the Provisional Parliament, and outlines legal strategies for dealing with the Provisional Government’s newly established Military Courts. Comyn advises treating these courts similarly to British Military Courts in Cork (December 1920): defending prisoners in court, applying for a writ of Habeas Corpus to the Master of the Rolls, and appealing to the House of Lords if refused. He notes that Republicans could not officially engage but draws parallels to past non-recognition tactics, where the Republican Government allowed prisoners to retain counsel without formal party endorsement.
• Capture Location and Context: The letter was captured by Free State forces at Ernie O’Malley’s retreat (a safe house at 36 Ailesbury Road, Dublin) during the Civil War. ucd.ie +1 This location served as a hub for anti-Treaty activities, where O’Malley stored sensitive documents and coordinated operations. The presence of Comyn’s correspondence there indicates that O’Malley had access to or was safeguarding legal and strategic materials from republican figures like Comyn and Stack. This ties them through shared anti-Treaty logistics and networks, as Stack was a close associate of O’Malley (e.g., both were involved in subversive military and political activities documented in related items like P80/786). ucd.ie
• Broader Implications: The capture occurred amid Free State raids on anti-Treaty strongholds, highlighting how legal (Comyn) and military (O’Malley) elements of the republican cause intersected. O’Malley’s retreat yielded other documents, such as a despatch on appeals to Rome against Catholic Bishops’ condemnations (P80/773) and reviews of events leading to the Four Courts attack (P80/772, co-authored by O’Malley and Liam Mellows). ucd.ie While Comyn’s letter does not mention O’Malley, its discovery at his safe house underscores their alignment in resisting the Provisional Government.

Shared Republican Context and Networks

• Both were staunch anti-Treatyites: Comyn defended high-profile republicans like Erskine Childers (executed in November 1922) and challenged Free State actions through inquests and writs (e.g., his July 1922 Dáil Court application for a writ of prohibition). en.wikipedia.org O’Malley, meanwhile, occupied the Four Courts in April 1922, fought in key battles, was captured in November 1922, and participated in a 41-day hunger strike. jstor.org Their paths likely crossed indirectly via figures like de Valera (Comyn’s adviser; O’Malley’s superior) and Stack (recipient of Comyn’s letter; O’Malley’s correspondent in captured despatches). ucd.ie +1
• No evidence of pre-Civil War ties (e.g., via IRB or Gaelic League) or post-war interactions. O’Malley’s memoirs (On Another Man’s Wound and The Singing Flame) and BMH interviews (e.g., P17b series) detail his experiences but do not reference Comyn. core.ac.uk +1 Similarly, Comyn’s legal work (e.g., representing anti-Treaty prisoners) overlaps with O’Malley’s circle but without direct overlap.

In summary, while not personally linked, their connection reflects the intertwined legal and military facets of the anti-Treaty struggle, evidenced by the captured letter at O’Malley’s safe house. For deeper archival dives, consult the full Desmond FitzGerald Papers at UCD or O’Malley’s BMH collections.

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Austin Stack any links to Michael Comyn KC

Thought for 49s

Connections Between Austin Stack and Michael Comyn KCAustin Stack (1879–1929), a prominent Irish republican, Sinn Féin leader, and anti-Treaty figure during the Irish Civil War (1922–1923), and Michael Comyn KC (1871–1952), a barrister, de Valera’s legal adviser, and defender of republicans, had several documented direct and indirect links through their shared involvement in the Irish independence movement. Both were staunch anti-Treatyites after the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, with Stack serving as Minister for Finance in the republican shadow government and Comyn providing legal support to IRA prisoners and disrupting Free State proceedings. Below is a summary of their connections, based on historical records, archival documents, and biographical accounts.1. Meeting in London During Treaty Negotiations (July 1921)

• After the truce ending the Irish War of Independence (July 11, 1921), Comyn met with Arthur Griffith and Austin Stack in London. en.wikipedia.org +1 Comyn, leveraging his intelligence sources, revealed information from a high-placed British contact indicating that Prime Minister David Lloyd George was willing to negotiate terms acceptable to South African leader Jan Smuts and would prefer elections over resuming war if talks failed. en.wikipedia.org +1 This meeting occurred amid preliminary discussions leading to the Treaty, where Stack (then Minister for Home Affairs in the Dáil government) and Griffith were key figures. Comyn’s input aimed to strengthen the Irish negotiating position, highlighting their collaboration in republican diplomacy.

2. Correspondence During the Civil War (September–December 1922)

• September 20, 1922 Letter from Comyn to Stack: A letter from Comyn (as “Senior Counsel for the IRA”) to Stack discussed resolutions in the Provisional Parliament and legal strategies for handling Free State Military Courts. dokumen.pub Comyn advised treating these courts like British ones from 1920, recommending defenses, habeas corpus writs, and appeals to the House of Lords. This letter was captured by Free State forces at Ernie O’Malley’s anti-Treaty safe house (36 Ailesbury Road, Dublin), indicating it was part of republican coordination efforts. dokumen.pub
• December 31, 1922 Letter from Stack to Comyn: A letter from Stack (addressed to “MC” for Michael Comyn) expressed reservations about a “Revenue Decree” and sought Comyn’s input. ucd.ie This is documented in the Elgin O’Rahilly Papers (UCD Archives, P200), showing ongoing wartime communication between the two on administrative and legal matters in the anti-Treaty cause.

3. Possible Additional Correspondence (1922–1923)

• Archival records from the Art Ó Briain Papers (National Library of Ireland) describe correspondence between Art O’Brien, Austin Stack, and a “C. Ó M.” (dated November 1922–February 1923), focusing on transferring American funds to the “British I.R.A.” (likely meaning IRA operations in Britain or Ireland), establishing an Irish paper currency, and questioning the loyalties of James McElligott (a civil servant). catalogue.nli.ie While “C. Ó M.” is not explicitly identified as Comyn, the abbreviation aligns with his Irish name (Mícheál Ó Comáin), and the topics fit Comyn’s role in republican finances and legal advice. This suggests potential further links in funding and strategic discussions during the Civil War.

4. Shared Republican Networks and Activities

• Both were deeply embedded in anti-Treaty circles: Stack was a senior IRA and Sinn Féin leader, imprisoned multiple times and involved in hunger strikes, while Comyn defended anti-Treaty prisoners (e.g., Erskine Childers in November 1922) and participated in inquests (e.g., into Cathal Brugha and Harry Boland’s deaths) to challenge Free State actions on behalf of the IRA. en.wikipedia.org +1 Comyn’s work often saved republicans from execution, and Stack’s political roles (e.g., Minister for Home Affairs pre-Treaty, overseeing Dáil Courts) overlapped with Comyn’s legal practice in those courts. canisgallicus.com +1
• Indirect ties via Éamon de Valera: Comyn was de Valera’s principal legal adviser post-Civil War (advising on Fianna Fáil’s formation and The Irish Press), while Stack remained loyal to de Valera until his death in 1929, serving as Sinn Féin secretary. en.wikipedia.org +1 Comyn also contributed to peace efforts (e.g., a 1922–1923 draft on treaty terms), aligning with Stack’s anti-Treaty stance. canisgallicus.com

Summary Table of Key Links

No evidence of pre-1921 or post-Civil War personal ties (e.g., via family, IRB, or Gaelic League), but their collaborations reflect the intertwined political, legal, and military facets of the anti-Treaty struggle. If you have a specific aspect (e.g., a document), I can explore further!

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Details on September 1922 letter

Éamon de Valera’s role

Details on September 1922 letter

Thought for 1m 3s

Overview of the September 1922 LetterThe letter in question is cataloged as item P80/769 in the Desmond and Mabel FitzGerald Papers, archived at University College Dublin (UCD) Archives. ucd.ie +1 Dated September 20, 1922, it is a 2-page copy of a captured document originating from anti-Treaty republican circles during the Irish Civil War. The letter was seized by Free State forces at Ernie O’Malley’s safe house (referred to as his “retreat”) at 36 Ailesbury Road, Dublin—a key location for anti-Treaty IRA operations and document storage.

canisgallicus.com It was written by Michael Comyn KC (addressed as “Senior Counsel for the IRA”) to “A de S” (a coded reference to Austin Stack, a prominent anti-Treaty leader and former Dáil Minister for Home Affairs).

ucd.ieThis item falls within the collection’s section on captured anti-Treaty documents from the Civil War period (1922–1923), specifically under subsection 9.4.4, which includes communications, reports, and directives from republican leaders like Liam Lynch.

ucd.ie The FitzGerald Papers overall document Desmond FitzGerald’s (a pro-Treaty Sinn Féin figure and Minister for External Affairs) involvement in Irish independence, with many items like this one acquired through captures or intelligence during the conflict.

ucd.ie Surrounding items provide context: P80/768 is a letter from Stack and Seán T. O’Kelly authorizing management of the “Uphold the Republic Fund,” while P80/770 includes copies of anti-Treaty operation orders from IRA brigades in Wexford and Dublin.

ucd.ieContent and PurposeThe letter encloses a summary of recent events and focuses on two main topics:

• Resolutions Before the Provisional Parliament: It discusses ongoing debates and decisions in the Provisional Government (the pro-Treaty administration under W.T. Cosgrave), reflecting anti-Treaty efforts to monitor and counter Free State legislative moves amid the escalating war.
• Strategies for Provisional Government’s Military Courts: Comyn advises on legal tactics to challenge the newly established military tribunals, which the Free State used to try and execute anti-Treaty prisoners (e.g., under emergency powers enacted in September 1922). He draws parallels to republican responses to British military courts in Cork during the War of Independence (established in December 1920 under martial law). ucd.ie +1

Comyn’s recommendations emphasize a pragmatic legal approach: defending prisoners in court, applying for writs of habeas corpus (to challenge unlawful detention) to the Master of the Rolls, and appealing to the House of Lords if denied. He notes the irony that republicans could not act “officially” in this system, similar to their unrecognized status during the Cork courts, where the Dáil government allowed individual defenses without formal endorsement.

canisgallicus.com This reflects the anti-Treaty side’s hybrid strategy—combining military resistance with legal obstructionism—to undermine Free State authority.Key Excerpt from the LetterThe archival catalogue and related analyses provide the following quoted passage (note: this is not the full text, as the letter itself is not fully transcribed in publicly available sources; the excerpt ends abruptly with an ellipsis in the catalogue):

‘In my judgement we, on the legal side should face it exactly as we faced the Military Courts in Cork [established by the British in December 1920]. We should go in and defend the prisoners. Then we should apply to the Master of the Rolls for a Habeas Corpus and in case he refused, we should appeal to the Lords. Of course we could not do this officially as Republicans but when we were fighting the Military Courts in Cork, you know we were not recognised by the Republican Party. The Republican Government merely allowed the prisoners charged … to retain Counsel for their defence’. ucd.ie +1

No complete transcription of the letter or the enclosed summary appears in the browsed sources, suggesting researchers may need to access the physical archive at UCD for the original copy.

ucd.ieHistorical Context and SignificanceSent just weeks after the Free State’s establishment of military courts (via the Army Emergency Powers Resolution on September 28, 1922—though discussions predated this), the letter highlights anti-Treaty legal maneuvering during a period of intense conflict.

mural.maynoothuniversity.ie Comyn, as a barrister who frequently defended republicans (e.g., Erskine Childers in November 1922), was advocating for tactics that could delay executions and expose Free State overreach.

theirishstory.com Stack, as a key anti-Treaty financier and organizer, was a logical recipient for such strategic advice. The capture at O’Malley’s (who was arrested there in November 1922) underscores Free State intelligence successes in disrupting republican networks.

canisgallicus.comThis letter exemplifies the broader tensions: While anti-Treaty forces rejected Free State legitimacy, they pragmatically engaged its systems when beneficial, echoing Comyn’s earlier July 1922 writ of prohibition attempt against the Provisional Government.

theirishstory.com It also ties into ongoing peace whispers and cabinet debates in the Free State, where figures like George Gavan Duffy pushed for prisoner-of-war treatment.

mural.maynoothuniversity.ieFor full access, consult the UCD Archives (reference IE UCDA P80) or related collections like the Elgin O’Rahilly Papers (P200), which include a reciprocal December 1922 letter from Stack to Comyn.

ucd.ie If this refers to a different September 1922 letter, provide more context for refinement!

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Ernie O’Malley’s role in Civil War