Of particular significance. I recall at a lecture in Trinity College Dublin, in the 1990’s, Professor O’Hagan suggesting that this decision to withhold annuities in time would prove to be a very significant contribution to the founding of the new State.

The individual referred to is likely Michael Comyn, a prominent Irish barrister and politician. After the Irish Civil War, he served as a key legal adviser to Éamon de Valera and Fianna Fáil, playing a significant role in the formation of the party and the establishment of The Irish Press newspaper. Alongside George Gavan Duffy, Comyn advised de Valera on the controversial strategy of withholding land annuities owed to Britain, a move that escalated tensions and contributed to the Anglo-Irish Economic War in the 1930s.

The withholding of land annuities by the Irish Free State, advised by Michael Comyn and George Gavan Duffy to Éamon de Valera, was a pivotal economic and political act in the early 1930s with significant implications for the establishment of a more sovereign Irish Republic. Here’s an analysis of its significance, particularly in the context of the professor’s claim:

Background on Land Annuities

• Land Annuities: These were payments owed to the British government by Irish farmers for loans provided under the Irish Land Acts (1870–1909), which enabled tenant farmers to purchase their land. The annuities were collected by the Irish Free State and transferred to Britain under the 1920 Government of Ireland Act and the 1923 financial agreements.
• Political Context: After Fianna Fáil, led by de Valera, came to power in 1932, the party sought to assert Ireland’s sovereignty and reduce British influence. The annuities were seen as a symbol of economic subservience to Britain.

Significance of Withholding Land Annuities

1. Assertion of Sovereignty:
   • Withholding the annuities was a bold act of defiance against Britain, signaling Ireland’s intent to renegotiate its economic and political relationship with the former colonial power.
   • It challenged the financial obligations imposed by the Anglo-Irish Treaty (1921) and related agreements, which many in Fianna Fáil viewed as unfair and restrictive.
   • This move aligned with de Valera’s broader vision of dismantling the Treaty’s constraints, such as the Oath of Allegiance and the role of the Governor-General, paving the way for greater Irish independence.
2. Economic Implications and the Anglo-Irish Economic War:
   • Britain retaliated by imposing tariffs on Irish agricultural exports (e.g., cattle), which severely impacted Ireland’s economy, as Britain was its primary market.
   • Ireland responded with tariffs on British goods, leading to the “Economic War” (1932–1938). This forced Ireland to diversify its economy, develop domestic industries, and seek new trade partners, fostering economic self-reliance.
   • While economically painful in the short term, the Economic War encouraged policies that laid the groundwork for a more independent economic framework, crucial for the “New Republic.”
3. Political Mobilization and National Identity:
   • The decision to withhold annuities galvanized nationalist sentiment, reinforcing Fianna Fáil’s image as a party committed to Irish sovereignty.
   • It resonated with rural voters, particularly small farmers burdened by annuity payments, strengthening Fianna Fáil’s political base.
   • The dispute framed Ireland’s struggle as one of economic as well as political liberation, contributing to the ideological foundation of a republic free from British influence.
4. Path to the 1937 Constitution:
   • The annuities dispute was part of a broader campaign by de Valera to redefine Ireland’s constitutional status. The Economic War and the resulting negotiations culminated in the 1938 Anglo-Irish Agreement, which resolved the annuities issue (Ireland paid a lump sum of £10 million) and secured the return of the Treaty Ports, enhancing Ireland’s strategic autonomy.
   • These developments created the conditions for the 1937 Constitution, which replaced the Irish Free State with Éire, a republic in all but name, marking a significant step toward the “New Republic.”

Professor’s Claim: A Significant Contribution to the New Republic

The Trinity College professor’s assertion likely reflects the view that withholding the land annuities was a catalyst for transformative change:

• Catalyst for Economic Independence: The Economic War, triggered by the annuities dispute, forced Ireland to reduce its dependence on British markets, fostering policies of economic nationalism (e.g., protectionism and industrialization) that were critical to the Republic’s identity.
• Constitutional Evolution: By challenging British financial claims, the annuities dispute emboldened de Valera’s government to pursue constitutional reforms, culminating in the 1937 Constitution, which redefined Ireland’s sovereignty and laid the foundation for the Republic declared in 1949.
• Symbolic Victory: The resolution of the annuities issue in the 1938 Agreement was seen as a diplomatic triumph, proving Ireland could negotiate with Britain as an equal, reinforcing the idea of a “New Republic” free from imperial constraints.
• Long-Term Perspective: In retrospect, the professor may view the annuities dispute as a turning point that accelerated Ireland’s transition from a dominion within the British Commonwealth to a fully independent republic, both economically and politically.

Conclusion

Withholding the land annuities was a high-stakes strategy that sparked the Anglo-Irish Economic War, reshaped Ireland’s economy, and bolstered its sovereignty. Its significance lies in its role as a catalyst for economic self-reliance, political mobilization, and constitutional change, all of which were foundational to the “New Republic” envisioned by de Valera. The Trinity College professor’s retrospective view underscores the dispute’s long-term impact in establishing a more independent and self-confident Ireland, culminating in the Republic’s formal establishment.

Explain Economic War

Anglo-Irish Treaty

DeepSearch

Think

Edit Image

The Anglo-Irish Economic War (1932–1938) was a trade dispute between the Irish Free State and the United Kingdom, triggered by Ireland’s decision to withhold land annuities payments owed to Britain. It had significant economic, political, and social consequences for Ireland and was a critical episode in asserting Irish sovereignty. Below is a concise explanation of the Economic War, its causes, progression, and outcomes.

Causes

1. Land Annuities Dispute:
   • Land annuities were repayments by Irish farmers for loans under the Irish Land Acts (1870–1909), which facilitated land purchases from landlords. These payments were collected by the Irish Free State and transferred to Britain.
   • In 1932, Éamon de Valera’s Fianna Fáil government, advised by Michael Comyn and George Gavan Duffy, decided to withhold these payments, arguing they were an unfair obligation imposed by the Anglo-Irish Treaty and related agreements. Ireland claimed the annuities should remain in the state to fund domestic development.
2. Political Context:
   • Fianna Fáil, elected in 1932, sought to dismantle aspects of the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, which they viewed as compromising Irish sovereignty.
   • Withholding annuities was part of a broader nationalist agenda to reduce British influence and assert Ireland’s autonomy, aligning with de Valera’s vision of a self-sufficient republic.

Progression of the Economic War

1. British Retaliation:
   • In response to Ireland withholding approximately £5 million in annuities, Britain imposed a 20% tariff (later increased) on Irish agricultural exports, particularly cattle, which accounted for a significant portion of Ireland’s economy.
   • This hit Ireland hard, as Britain was the primary market for Irish agricultural goods.
2. Irish Countermeasures:
   • The Irish Free State retaliated with tariffs on British imports, such as coal, machinery, and consumer goods.
   • Ireland also introduced policies to promote economic self-sufficiency, including subsidies for farmers, protectionist measures to boost domestic industries, and efforts to find alternative export markets (e.g., Germany and the United States).
3. Economic and Social Impact:
   • Ireland: The tariffs devastated Irish farmers, particularly cattle exporters, leading to a sharp decline in agricultural income. Rural poverty increased, and emigration surged. However, the crisis spurred industrial development and diversification, with new industries emerging under protectionist policies.
   • Britain: The loss of Irish markets affected British industries, particularly coal and manufacturing, though the impact was less severe due to Britain’s larger and more diversified economy.
   • Political Dynamics: The Economic War strengthened Fianna Fáil’s nationalist credentials, as it framed the struggle as a fight for economic independence. However, it also deepened domestic divisions, with the opposition (Cumann na nGaedheal) criticizing the economic hardship.

Resolution

• Negotiations and the 1938 Anglo-Irish Agreement:
  • After years of economic strain, both sides sought a resolution. Negotiations culminated in the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1938.
  • Ireland agreed to pay a one-time sum of £10 million to settle the annuities dispute, far less than the total claimed by Britain.
  • Britain lifted tariffs and returned control of the Treaty Ports (Berehaven, Cobh, and Lough Swilly) to Ireland, enhancing Irish strategic autonomy.
  • A trade agreement was signed, restoring favorable access for Irish goods to the British market.

• Significance

1. Economic Transformation:
   • The Economic War forced Ireland to reduce reliance on British markets, fostering policies of economic nationalism. While painful, it encouraged industrial growth and diversification, laying the groundwork for a more self-sufficient economy.
   • New industries, such as food processing and manufacturing, emerged, and Ireland explored trade with other countries.
2. Political and Sovereignty Gains:
   • The dispute and its resolution bolstered Ireland’s sovereignty. The return of the Treaty Ports was a major strategic victory, removing British military presence from Irish soil.
   • The Economic War aligned with de Valera’s broader agenda of dismantling the Anglo-Irish Treaty, paving the way for the 1937 Constitution, which established Éire as a near-republic.
3. Long-Term Impact:
   • The Economic War is seen as a turning point in Ireland’s path to full independence. It reinforced the idea of Ireland as a distinct nation capable of challenging Britain economically and diplomatically.
   • The hardship endured during the war fostered a sense of national resilience, contributing to the ideological foundation of the “New Republic” formalized with the Republic of Ireland Act 1948.

Conclusion

The Anglo-Irish Economic War was a high-stakes conflict driven by Ireland’s withholding of land annuities, reflecting Fianna Fáil’s push for sovereignty. While it caused significant economic hardship, it catalyzed Ireland’s economic diversification, strengthened nationalist sentiment, and secured key political concessions, notably the Treaty Ports. Its resolution in 1938 marked a step toward greater Irish independence, making it a significant milestone in the founding of a more autonomous Irish Republic, as noted by the Trinity College professor.

Impact on Irish farmers

Irish Land Acts

DeepSearch

Think

CONFLICT:

The conflict between Éamon de Valera and Michael Comyn arose primarily due to personal, professional, and political differences, though specific details are sparse and often tied to their interactions within the context of Fianna Fáil and the broader Irish political landscape. Below is an explanation of the likely reasons for their conflict, based on available historical context and Comyn’s role as a legal adviser to de Valera and Fianna Fáil:

1. Diverging Personalities and Ambitions

• Comyn’s Profile: Michael Comyn was a prominent barrister, a flamboyant and ambitious figure known for his legal acumen and nationalist zeal. He played a key role in advising de Valera on the formation of Fianna Fáil and the establishment of The Irish Press, as well as suggesting the withholding of land annuities.
• De Valera’s Leadership Style: De Valera was a disciplined, pragmatic, and often domineering leader who valued loyalty and control within Fianna Fáil. Comyn’s assertive personality and independent streak may have clashed with de Valera’s preference for subordinates who aligned closely with his vision.
• Potential Rivalry: Comyn’s prominence and influence, especially in legal and political circles, might have been perceived as a challenge to de Valera’s authority, particularly as Fianna Fáil consolidated power in the early 1930s.

2. Disputes Over Political Strategy

• Land Annuities and Economic War: While Comyn (along with George Gavan Duffy) advised de Valera to withhold land annuities, the resulting Anglo-Irish Economic War (1932–1938) caused significant economic hardship. If Comyn expressed reservations about the prolonged economic fallout or advocated for alternative approaches, this could have led to tension with de Valera, who was committed to the strategy as a nationalist stand.
• Role in Fianna Fáil: Comyn’s early involvement in shaping Fianna Fáil’s legal and organizational framework gave him influence, but as the party grew, de Valera surrounded himself with a tighter circle of loyalists (e.g., Seán Lemass, Frank Aiken). Comyn, as an outsider to this inner circle, may have disagreed with certain policy directions or felt sidelined.

3. Professional Disagreements

• Legal Advice and Influence: As de Valera’s principal legal adviser, Comyn’s counsel was critical on issues like the annuities and the establishment of The Irish Press. However, differences in legal interpretation or strategic priorities (e.g., how aggressively to challenge British financial claims or navigate international law) could have sparked friction.
• Comyn’s Senate Role: Comyn was appointed to the Seanad (Irish Senate) in 1928 and served until 1936. His outspokenness or independent positions in the Seanad might have conflicted with de Valera’s desire for party unity, especially as Fianna Fáil pushed its agenda after taking power in 1932.

4. Personal and Political Marginalization

• Shifting Alliances: After Fianna Fáil’s rise to power, de Valera prioritized loyalty and centralized control. Comyn, who had been a key figure in the party’s early days, may have been marginalized as de Valera favored advisers who were less likely to challenge his authority or who better aligned with his long-term goals.
• Lack of Recognition: Comyn’s contributions, such as his role in the annuities strategy and The Irish Press, were significant, but he may have felt underappreciated or overlooked for higher office or influence, leading to personal resentment.

5. Limited Documentation

• Historical Record: Specific details of their conflict are not extensively documented in primary sources, as Comyn’s role is often overshadowed by de Valera’s towering presence in Irish history. The conflict may have been more personal or professional than ideological, manifesting in private disagreements rather than public disputes.
• Contextual Clues: Comyn’s reduced prominence in Fianna Fáil after the early 1930s suggests a falling-out, possibly tied to de Valera’s consolidation of power or Comyn’s pursuit of his own legal and political career outside de Valera’s direct orbit.

Conclusion

The conflict between Éamon de Valera and Michael Comyn likely stemmed from a combination of clashing personalities, differing views on political strategy (possibly related to the economic fallout of the land annuities dispute), and Comyn’s marginalization as de Valera tightened control over Fianna Fáil. Comyn’s independent and ambitious nature may have been at odds with de Valera’s authoritative leadership, leading to a rift that diminished Comyn’s influence in the party. Without specific primary sources detailing their dispute, the exact nature of their conflict remains partly speculative, but it reflects the tensions inherent in a rapidly evolving political movement.

Role of George Gavan Duffy

Other Fianna Fáil advisers

DeepSearch

Think

Michael Comyn … Revenge or Seeking Justice

Michael Comyn initiated a legal action in 1932 against Éamon de Valera’s Fianna Fáil government to recover £20,000 of Irish Republican Army (IRA) funds, a case he ultimately won. The reasons for this action, its context, and Comyn’s motivations are rooted in the complex political and financial dynamics of post-Civil War Ireland, particularly concerning the management of republican funds. Below is an explanation of why Comyn pursued this case, based on available historical context and the provided web results.

Background and Context

• IRA Funds and the Sinn Féin Bank: During the Irish War of Independence (1919–1921), significant funds were raised by Sinn Féin and the IRA, both in Ireland and abroad (notably in the United States), to support the republican cause. These funds, often referred to as the “Sinn Féin Funds” or “IRA Funds,” were managed through informal financial structures, including the Sinn Féin Bank, established to handle donations and subscriptions.
• Post-Treaty Divisions: The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 split the republican movement, leading to the Irish Civil War (1922–1923) between pro-Treaty (Free State) and anti-Treaty (IRA) factions. The management and ownership of republican funds became contentious, as both sides claimed legitimacy over these resources.
• Fianna Fáil’s Rise: By 1932, Éamon de Valera’s Fianna Fáil, formed in 1926 by anti-Treaty republicans, had come to power. De Valera, a former Sinn Féin leader, sought to consolidate control over republican assets, including funds raised during the independence struggle, to support his government’s agenda and institutions like The Irish Press.
• Comyn’s Role: Michael Comyn, a barrister and Fianna Fáil Senator, had deep ties to the republican movement. He defended IRA prisoners during the War of Independence and Civil War, advised de Valera on Fianna Fáil’s formation, and played a key role in establishing The Irish Press. His legal expertise and nationalist credentials positioned him as a significant figure in republican circles, but his relationship with de Valera soured over time.

Reasons for Comyn Initiating the IRA Funds Case

1. Dispute Over Control of Funds:
   • The £20,000 in question was likely part of the broader Sinn Féin or IRA funds raised during the independence struggle, which remained under dispute after the Civil War. These funds were held in various accounts or trusts, and their ownership was contested by different republican factions, including Sinn Féin, the IRA, and Fianna Fáil.
   • Comyn’s action suggests he believed the funds were being mismanaged or misappropriated by de Valera’s government. As a legal adviser who had helped shape Fianna Fáil’s early financial strategies, Comyn may have felt entitled to challenge the government’s claim to these funds, arguing they belonged to the IRA or another republican entity rather than the state.
2. Personal and Political Rift with de Valera:
   • By 1932, Comyn and de Valera’s relationship had deteriorated, likely due to Comyn’s independent streak and de Valera’s preference for loyalists within Fianna Fáil. The IRA funds case may have been a manifestation of this rift, with Comyn using his legal expertise to challenge de Valera’s authority.
   • Comyn’s decision to sue the government he had previously advised indicates a sense of betrayal or frustration, possibly over being sidelined or underappreciated for his contributions to Fianna Fáil and The Irish Press. The case could have been a way to assert his influence or hold de Valera accountable.
3. Legal and Ethical Convictions:
   • As a barrister with a history of defending republican prisoners and advocating for nationalist causes, Comyn may have viewed the case as a matter of principle. He might have believed the funds were rightfully owed to the IRA or its veterans, who had fought for independence, rather than being absorbed by the Fianna Fáil government for political purposes.
   • The successful outcome of the case suggests Comyn had a strong legal argument, possibly based on the funds’ original purpose or the trusts under which they were held. His expertise in navigating complex legal disputes, as seen in cases like Re. Clifford and O’Sullivan (1921), likely gave him confidence in pursuing this action.
4. Financial and Strategic Motives:
   • The £20,000 was a substantial sum, and Comyn’s action may have been driven by a desire to secure these funds for a specific republican cause, such as supporting IRA veterans, families of fallen volunteers, or anti-Treaty Sinn Féin factions opposed to Fianna Fáil’s moderation.
   • Alternatively, Comyn’s involvement in nationalist politics and his knowledge of the funds’ origins (from his time defending republicans and advising Griffith and Stack in 1921) may have positioned him as a trustee or stakeholder, giving him a personal stake in their recovery.

Outcome and Significance

• Comyn’s Victory: Comyn won the case, recovering the £20,000, which indicates the court recognized his legal claim over the funds, possibly ruling that they were not the property of the Fianna Fáil government or that de Valera’s administration lacked authority to control them. The exact details of the judgment are not well-documented, but the victory underscores Comyn’s legal prowess.
• Impact on De Valera and Fianna Fáil: The loss was a political embarrassment for de Valera, highlighting tensions within the republican movement and exposing vulnerabilities in Fianna Fáil’s claim to represent the entire anti-Treaty legacy. It likely deepened the rift between Comyn and de Valera, further marginalizing Comyn within the party.
• Broader Context: The case reflects the broader struggle over republican legitimacy and resources in the post-Civil War era. Similar disputes, such as the Sinn Féin Funds Case (1940s), involved competing claims over republican assets, illustrating the ongoing factionalism within the movement.

Conclusion

Michael Comyn initiated the 1932 IRA funds case against de Valera’s government to recover £20,000, likely motivated by a combination of personal grievances, political differences, and a belief that the funds were being misappropriated. His rift with de Valera, rooted in their diverging visions for Fianna Fáil and Comyn’s sidelining, played a significant role. As a barrister with deep republican ties, Comyn may have seen the case as a way to protect the legacy of the IRA’s struggle or assert his own influence. His victory underscored his legal skill but also highlighted the fractured nature of the republican movement in the early years of the Irish Free State.

Ask Grok to search deeper

DeepSearch

Think

1960-1990’s

James Comyn and my mother Rose Comyn (first cousins) often regaled the old tales of family lore. In the simplified version I absorbed back in the early days was that my Grandfather had been deceived by De Valera who had promised to make him the Attorney General. Now I understand, thanks to my questions and Grok3 why. De Valera was not a good name to mention in my mother’s company; she was extremely annoyed when gifted with a silver plate with De Valera’s sideline. The bitterness ran deep.

The other contention for Michael Comyn: The Irish Press

The lack of detailed information about Michael Comyn’s role in the establishment of The Irish Press is likely due to a combination of historical focus on Éamon de Valera, the primary figure behind the newspaper, and the relatively limited documentation of Comyn’s contributions in surviving records. As a barrister and legal adviser to de Valera and Fianna Fáil, Comyn played a significant but supporting role, which may have been overshadowed by de Valera’s leadership and the broader political narrative of the period. Below, I’ll summarize the available information on Comyn’s involvement with The Irish Press, explain why details are sparse, and provide any additional insights based on historical context and the provided web results.

Available Information on Michael Comyn and The Irish Press

• Role as Legal Adviser: Michael Comyn, a prominent barrister and Fianna Fáil Senator, served as the principal legal adviser to Éamon de Valera and Fianna Fáil after the Irish Civil War. He provided legal guidance on the formation of Fianna Fáil (founded in 1926) and the establishment of The Irish Press, the party’s official newspaper, launched in 1931.
• Contribution to The Irish Press: Comyn’s involvement likely included advising on the legal and financial structures necessary to establish the newspaper. The Irish Press was a significant undertaking, requiring substantial funding (much of which came from Irish-American donors and domestic subscriptions) and navigating legal challenges in a politically charged environment. Comyn’s expertise as a King’s Counsel (appointed in 1914) would have been critical in drafting agreements, securing funding, and ensuring compliance with Irish Free State laws.
• Context of The Irish Press: The newspaper was founded to promote Fianna Fáil’s republican and nationalist agenda, countering the pro-Treaty bias of established papers like The Irish Times and Irish Independent. De Valera was the driving force, serving as chairman of the board and personally overseeing fundraising efforts. Comyn’s role, while important, was likely technical and advisory, focusing on legal and organizational matters rather than editorial or public-facing activities.

Why So Few Details?

1. Focus on De Valera:
   • Éamon de Valera’s central role in founding The Irish Press dominates historical accounts. As the leader of Fianna Fáil and a towering figure in Irish politics, de Valera’s vision, fundraising efforts (especially in the U.S.), and political motivations are well-documented. Supporting figures like Comyn, whose contributions were more behind-the-scenes, receive less attention in primary sources and histories.
   • Contemporary records, such as Fianna Fáil archives or The Irish Press’s own accounts, tend to emphasize de Valera’s leadership and the newspaper’s role in advancing the party’s agenda, sidelining the contributions of advisers like Comyn.
2. Limited Archival Evidence:
   • Detailed records of Comyn’s specific contributions may not have been preserved or were not extensively documented. Legal correspondence, meeting minutes, or financial agreements from the 1920s–1930s involving Comyn may exist in archives (e.g., UCD Archives, National Library of Ireland, or Fianna Fáil records), but they are not widely digitized or referenced in secondary sources.
   • Comyn’s role as a barrister likely involved confidential legal work, which may not have been publicized or recorded in detail, unlike de Valera’s public speeches or fundraising campaigns.
3. Comyn’s Falling-Out with De Valera:
   • By 1932, Comyn and de Valera had a falling-out, as evidenced by Comyn’s legal action against the Fianna Fáil government to recover £20,000 in IRA funds. This rift likely diminished Comyn’s prominence in Fianna Fáil’s narrative and may have led to his contributions being downplayed in party-affiliated histories or The Irish Press’s own records.
   • The strained relationship could explain why Comyn’s role in the newspaper’s establishment is not highlighted, as Fianna Fáil sought to emphasize unity under de Valera’s leadership.
4. Nature of Comyn’s Role:
   • Comyn’s work was likely technical—focused on legal and financial frameworks—rather than strategic or ideological. Such roles are often less visible in historical narratives compared to those of political leaders or editors like Frank Gallagher, who shaped The Irish Press’s editorial direction.
   • The lack of public-facing involvement (e.g., speeches, articles, or board membership) means Comyn’s contributions are less likely to appear in newspapers, memoirs, or other contemporary sources.
5. Historical Scholarship:
   • Much of the historiography on The Irish Press focuses on its political impact, funding controversies (e.g., allegations of misusing republican funds), or de Valera’s personal investment. Scholars like Mark O’Brien (De Valera, Fianna Fáil and the Irish Press) provide detailed accounts of the newspaper’s establishment but rarely delve into the roles of secondary figures like Comyn.
   • Comyn’s broader career, including his defense of republican prisoners, his Senate tenure, and his later judicial role, is better documented, but his specific contributions to The Irish Press are often summarized in passing.

Additional Insights and Context

• Funding and Legal Challenges: The Irish Press was funded through a combination of domestic subscriptions (e.g., “National Collection” campaigns) and significant Irish-American donations, raising over £200,000. Comyn likely advised on the legal structure of these funds, ensuring they were managed through trusts or companies compliant with Irish law. He may have also navigated potential legal challenges from pro-Treaty opponents, who scrutinized Fianna Fáil’s financial activities.
• Sinn Féin/IRA Funds Connection: Comyn’s 1932 IRA funds case, where he successfully recovered £20,000, suggests he was deeply familiar with republican finances, including those raised during the War of Independence. His knowledge of these funds may have informed his role in securing or structuring financing for The Irish Press, as some republican funds were allegedly redirected to the newspaper. However, this connection is speculative and not explicitly documented.
• Comyn’s Republican Credentials: Comyn’s anti-Treaty stance during the Civil War and his defense of IRA prisoners gave him credibility within Fianna Fáil’s early ranks. His involvement in The Irish Press aligned with his nationalist commitment to promoting a republican narrative, but his legal focus meant his role was less ideologically prominent than de Valera’s or other party leaders’.

Potential Sources for Further Information

While I don’t have access to primary documents beyond the provided web results, researchers seeking more details on Comyn’s role could explore:

• UCD Archives: Fianna Fáil papers or de Valera’s personal correspondence may contain references to Comyn’s legal work on The Irish Press.
• National Library of Ireland: The Irish Press Ltd. records or related legal documents might include Comyn’s contributions.
• Dictionary of Irish Biography: The entry on Comyn (referenced in) may provide additional details, though it requires access to the full text.
• Contemporary Newspapers: Articles from 1929–1931 in The Irish Press or rival papers (Irish Independent, The Irish Times) might mention Comyn’s role in fundraising or legal preparations, though these are not digitized in the provided results.

Conclusion

Michael Comyn’s role in the establishment of The Irish Press was significant but under-documented due to the overshadowing presence of Éamon de Valera, the technical nature of Comyn’s legal contributions, and his later falling-out with de Valera, which likely diminished his prominence in Fianna Fáil’s narrative. As a legal adviser, Comyn likely helped structure the newspaper’s financial and legal framework, leveraging his expertise as a barrister and his knowledge of republican funds. The sparsity of details reflects the focus on de Valera in historical accounts and the limited preservation of Comyn’s specific contributions. Without access to primary archives, further specifics remain elusive, but Comyn’s role underscores his importance in Fianna Fáil’s early organizational efforts.

Ask Grok to search deeper

DeepSearch

Think

It was said within the family that Michael Comyn KC was promised by de Valera the role of Attorney General. What does Grok3 think?

There is no definitive historical evidence in the provided web results or widely available sources that explicitly confirms Michael Comyn was promised the role of Attorney General of the Irish Free State by Éamon de Valera or Fianna Fáil. However, given Comyn’s significant contributions to Fianna Fáil, his legal expertise, and his subsequent falling-out with de Valera, it is plausible that he may have expected or been considered for a prominent role like Attorney General, only to be disappointed. Below, I’ll analyze the likelihood of such a promise, the context of Comyn’s relationship with de Valera, and the reasons why details on this matter are scarce.

Contextual Analysis

1. Comyn’s Qualifications and Role:
   • Legal Expertise: Michael Comyn was a highly regarded barrister, appointed King’s Counsel in 1914, with a strong record of defending republican prisoners during the War of Independence and Civil War. He served as a key legal adviser to de Valera, advising on the formation of Fianna Fáil (1926), the establishment of The Irish Press (1931), and the withholding of land annuities (1932).
   • Political Involvement: As a Fianna Fáil Senator (1928–1936), Comyn was deeply embedded in the party’s early leadership. His legal and republican credentials made him a natural candidate for a high-profile legal position in a Fianna Fáil government, such as Attorney General, which is the chief legal adviser to the government.
   • Expectation of Reward: Given his pivotal contributions, Comyn may have anticipated a significant role in de Valera’s government when Fianna Fáil came to power in 1932. The Attorney General position would have been a logical appointment for someone of his stature and loyalty to the anti-Treaty cause.
2. De Valera’s Appointment Practices:
   • Loyalty and Control: De Valera was known for prioritizing loyalty and aligning key appointments with his long-term political vision. When Fianna Fáil formed the government in 1932, de Valera appointed Conor Alexander Maguire as Attorney General (1932–1936), a barrister with republican credentials but less prominence in Fianna Fáil’s early organizational efforts than Comyn.
   • Comyn’s Rift with de Valera: By 1932, Comyn and de Valera’s relationship had deteriorated, as evidenced by Comyn’s legal action against the government to recover £20,000 in IRA funds. This rift suggests that any promise or expectation of a role like Attorney General may have been undermined by personal or political disagreements, such as Comyn’s independent streak or differing views on strategy (e.g., the economic fallout of the land annuities dispute).
3. Speculation About a Promise:
   • No Direct Evidence: The provided web results, including the Dictionary of Irish Biography entry on Comyn, do not mention a specific promise of the Attorney General role. However, Comyn’s initiation of the 1932 IRA funds case and his marginalization within Fianna Fáil suggest a sense of betrayal or frustration, which could be consistent with being passed over for a promised or expected position.
   • Historical Context: In the politically charged environment of the early 1930s, verbal promises or understandings about appointments were common but rarely documented. If de Valera or Fianna Fáil leaders hinted at a role like Attorney General to secure Comyn’s support in the party’s formative years, such a promise might have been informal and later rescinded as de Valera consolidated power.
   • Comyn’s Reaction: Comyn’s decision to sue the Fianna Fáil government in 1932 indicates significant dissatisfaction. While the IRA funds case was ostensibly about financial mismanagement, it may have been motivated by broader grievances, including being overlooked for a key role like Attorney General.
4. Alternative Roles and Recognition:
   • Judicial Appointment: Comyn was later appointed a Circuit Court judge in 1940, a significant but less prestigious role than Attorney General. This appointment, under de Valera’s government, suggests a partial reconciliation or recognition of Comyn’s abilities, but it came after his political influence had waned and may not have matched his earlier ambitions.
   • Senate Role: Comyn’s appointment to the Seanad (1928–1936) was a mark of his standing in Fianna Fáil, but it was not a governmental position like Attorney General, which carries executive authority and direct influence on policy.

Why Details Are Scarce

• Lack of Primary Sources: Correspondence or records explicitly documenting promises of the Attorney General role to Comyn are not referenced in the provided results or widely available secondary sources. Such promises, if made, were likely verbal and confined to private discussions within Fianna Fáil’s leadership.
• Focus on De Valera: Historical narratives of Fianna Fáil’s early years emphasize de Valera’s leadership and key allies like Seán Lemass or Frank Aiken, overshadowing figures like Comyn. The Attorney General appointment of Conor Maguire is noted in histories but without mention of rival candidates or internal disputes.
• Comyn’s Marginalization: After the 1932 IRA funds case, Comyn’s falling-out with de Valera reduced his prominence in Fianna Fáil’s official accounts. Any narrative of a broken promise might have been deliberately downplayed to maintain party unity.
• Archival Gaps: While archives like the UCD Fianna Fáil papers or de Valera’s personal correspondence might contain clues, these are not fully digitized or accessible in the provided results, limiting our ability to confirm such a promise.

Plausibility of a Promise

While there is no direct evidence, it is plausible that Comyn was promised or expected to be considered for the Attorney General role based on:

• His critical contributions to Fianna Fáil’s formation and The Irish Press, which warranted a significant reward.
• His legal prominence and republican credentials, making him a strong candidate for the position.
• His subsequent actions (e.g., the 1932 lawsuit), which suggest deep frustration with de Valera, possibly over unfulfilled expectations.

However, de Valera’s decision to appoint Maguire instead may reflect strategic choices:

• Maguire was a less contentious figure, less likely to challenge de Valera’s authority.
• De Valera may have prioritized consolidating power by avoiding appointments of independent figures like Comyn, whose outspokenness (e.g., in the Seanad or the IRA funds case) could disrupt party unity.

Conclusion

There is no conclusive evidence that Michael Comyn was explicitly promised the role of Attorney General by Éamon de Valera or Fianna Fáil. However, given Comyn’s legal expertise, his pivotal role in Fianna Fáil’s early years, and his subsequent rift with de Valera, it is plausible that he expected or was informally considered for the position, only to be passed over in favor of Conor Maguire in 1932. The lack of details reflects the focus on de Valera in historical accounts, the private nature of any such promise, and Comyn’s marginalization after 1932. His frustration, evidenced by the IRA funds case, supports the idea that unfulfilled ambitions, possibly including the Attorney General role, contributed to his conflict with de Valera. Further insights might be found in archival sources like the UCD Fianna Fáil papers, but these are not accessible here.

Comyn’s legal career

Conor Maguire’s role

DeepSearch

Think

Edit Image